Comparing Hindu Nationalism with Slovak Nationalism and It's Use by Radical Right Against Minorities in India and Slovakia

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Abstract: Based on secondary sources, this article is a comparative analysis of the Hindu and Slovak nationalism and its use by radical right and extremists parties to marginalise Muslim minorities in India and, Roma, Hungarian, and Muslims in Slovakia. The initial segment of this article is focussed to an examination of Slovak nationalism and its proponents within the political landscape of Slovakia. This is followed by a discussion on the Islamophobic sentiment in Slovak politics. The subsequent section provides a comprehensive background on the evolution of Hindu nationalism in India, followed by an in-depth analysis of Islamophobia in India by radical right groups. The subsequent section involves a comparative analysis of the impact of Slovak and Hindu nationalism on Muslim minorities, followed by conclusion.

Keywords: Radical Right, Muslim Minorities, Hindu Nationalism, Slovak Politics

Why Comparison?

Despite differences in their geography, political system, and population size, India and Slovakia have both experienced hegemonic domination by the powerful empires, albeit in different time periods. India was colonized by the British whereas Slovakia was part of the various empires. The formation of nationalism occurred in these countries, despite the absence of a distinct nation state. Nevertheless, nationalism, particularly ethno-nationalism, has played a divisive role in both nations. In the context of this article, numerous prominent scholars have observed that radical right-wing ideologies pose a significant threat to liberal democracy and the democratic order in both countries

(Minkenberg 2010; Gyárfášová 2019; Mesežnikov 2021; Jaffrelot 1996; Kinnvall 2019). Presently, both countries are governed by populist radical right (PRR) parties, which have manifested in nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007). The PRR is predicated on the politics of nationalism as its core ideological tenet. It is noteworthy that a decade has elapsed since the rise to power of radical right nationalist political parties in both India and Slovakia. While the far-right populist parties and organisations in both countries have evolved under distinct circumstances, their political behaviour, particularly with respect to the majority population, exhibits notable parallels. These parallels include anti-democratic tendencies, Islamophobic sentiment, an emphasis on ethno-nationalism, and populist leanings. The prevailing sentiment in both countries is characterised by nationalist and nativist sentiments, with a concomitant resentment towards religious minorities and democratic dissenters. These sentiments render the majority population more receptive to radical right ideologies (Gyárfášová 2019; Kinnvall 2019).

In both countries, the mobilisation of intolerance against those who voice opposition and religious minorities, as well as the denial or disrespect of minority rights, has become a central political issue. The emergence of nationalism and populism has served to impede the development of liberal secular democracy in both Slovakia and India. The Slovak majority perceives its country from an ethnocentric perspective, a viewpoint shared by the Hindu majority in India. Hindu nationalism, akin to Slovak nationalism, is predicated on cultural and ethnic nationalism. However, a demographic within both nations subscribe to civic and inclusive nationalism. However, in both countries, radical right parties and extremist organisations have been observed to mobilise support along an ethno-nationalistic cleavage. In both countries, Islamophobic narratives have been politicised and mainstreamed by radical right parties, especially during national elections. Consequently, minorities' rights and human rights are challenged by these parties and their supporters (Gyárfášová 2019; Singh 2023). In both Slovakia and India, radical right parties and organizations espouse a nostalgic view of the nation's past and a grandiose interpretation of its cultural and historical legacy. This is exemplified by attributing paramount importance to the Moravian empire in Slovakia and the mythic kingdom of Lord Ram in India. These ideologies are underpinned by an ethnic and territorial conception of national identity. In light of this, the present article seeks to analyse the parallels and divergences between Hindu and Slovak nationalism, with a particular focus on the role of radical right nationalist political parties in both countries, and their utilisation of nationalism as a tool to persecute Muslim minorities.

Theoretical Core of Radical Right Populism

Radical right, extreme right and right-wing populism (Caiani 2017, cited in Gyárfášová, 2019:203) have some common manifestations, such as nationalism (internal homogenization, external exclusiveness, ethnonationalism and state nationalism), exclusionism (ethnopluralism, anti-Semitism), xenophobia, and a quest for a strong state, welfare chauvinism, traditional ethics, and revisionism (Mudde 2007:21). The ideological core of PRR, as Mudde (2007:19) comprises nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The concept of nativism emphasises that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (person or ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation. The concept of authoritarianism, as Mudde (2007:23) elucidates, is predicated on the principle of a meticulously structured societal order, where transgressions against authority are to be met with stringent consequences. Populism is defined as a 'thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people (Mudde 2007:23). The concept of nativism encompasses both nationalism and xenophobia. A narrow definition of PRR can be provided as the politics of nationalism.

In general, far and radical right party and organization are driven by the nativism which guide their attitude towards the 'other'. In Slovakia, parties such as SNS (Slovenská národná strana) – Slovak National Party, ĽSNS (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko) – People's Party Our Slovakia, Republika, and a civic association "Slovak Togetherness" (Slovenská pospolitosť in Slovak, SP), can be seen in this context, whereas in India political party such as BJP *(Bhartiya Janta Party-*Indian Peoples Party), and *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS- a Hindu cultural militia),* Shiv Sena are their Indian counterparts. Withing the theoretical framework of nationalism, this article analyses Slovak and Hindu nationalism and their carrier and agents in politics.

Historical Evolution of Slovak Nationalism

The majority of Eastern Europe was subject to multinational empires, including the Habsburg Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire. Dominant pattern among the 'Eastern nationalism', particularly Slovak nationalism is the emergence of a national identity without the nation state (Minkenberg 2010). This phenomenon can be exemplified by the concept of an ethno-cultural nationhood, which subsequently gave rise to the establishment of a nation-state, accompanied by a rapid democratisation.

However, this process was subsequently superseded by the advent of authoritarian dictatorships during the inter-war period and Communist regimes in the aftermath of World War II (Ibid). Under the majority of these regimes, the Slovak populace was systematically denied the opportunity to cultivate and advocate for an autonomous identity, cultural heritage and linguistic expression. Consequently, ethnicity emerged as a unifying factor among the Slovak population in their collective resistance against their rulers. The prevailing character of Slovak nationalism was identified as 'ethnic, rural and Catholic' (Minkenberg 2002). The concept of an ethnic Slovak identity was forged through the process of establishing a Slovak state, with languages and cultural identity serving as its foundational elements (Minkenberg 2010).

Slovakia is a country with a dominant titular ethnic entity (the Slovak nation) and religion (Catholicism), yet simultaneously exhibits a relatively high degree of ethnic and denominational diversity, as evidenced by the presence of ethnic minorities and groups (Hungarian and Roma minorities) as well as smaller religious groups. The country has experienced frequent changes in its social order and political regime, leading to varying degrees of self-identification among specific population groups (Gyárfášová, 2019:203).These groups have demonstrated allegiances to diverse political cultures, including democratic and authoritarian, influencing their political behaviour and the strategies employed by political actors to engage with them (Gyárfášová, 2019:203). This development was accompanied by an increase in national self-awareness among Slovaks, as well as a strong ethnic self-identification among members of the main indigenous minorities, particularly ethnic Hungarians (Ibid).

The ideology of the Slovak extreme right is connected to the legacy of the wartime clerico-fascist state, in which pseudo national independence was prioritised over political freedom (Gyárfášová, 2019). The historical legacies and socio-political structural factors have played a crucial role in the emergence of radical right in Slovakia, which employs nationalism in its politics. The long-term impact of these factors has shaped the socio-cultural environment in which nationalists and far-right radicals have flourished (Ibid).The Slovak State, established during the Nazi period (1939-1944), has served as a source of 'nostalgic inspiration' for far-right nationalist populist leaders and parties. Radical right populist nationalists frequently invoke the 'social security' and 'material comfort' provided under the Communist regime to the Slovak public for the purpose of politically polarising them. Since the establishment of the Slovak Republic on 1st January 1993, it has existed as a sovereign and civic national state. According to scholars (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, 2015),the socio-political environment that led

to the rise of radical right nationalist populist leaders was created by the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. The transition from a centrally controlled (particularly industry) Communist to liberal democracy in 1989 created a political opportunity and a social cleavage in the society for the radical right, who wooed voters dissatisfied with the turmoil of the 'transition years'. A comparable social cleavage emerged in the Indian society during the 1990s, a period characterised by the process of globalisation. This period was conducive to the rise of the radical right in India, as evidenced by the ascendance of the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), which currently holds a position of power.

During the period 1989-2000, the Slovak National Party (SNS) emerged as the primary proponent of Slovak nationalism, significantly influencing the political agenda. The adoption of an assertive nationalist rhetoric by the SNS in its electoral discourse resulted in an escalation of the prevailing socio-political climate, particularly with regard to inter-ethnic relations. This in turn led to heightened levels of competitiveness in terms of nationalism among other political actors (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, 2015). SNS is a prime exemplar of a radical right party that has flourished in Europe. Whether in office or out, the party has persistently fought against legislation that expanded the linguistic rights of the Hungarian minority (Bustikova 2014).

Gyarfasova and Meseznikov (2015:21) writes:

"By its approaches in political mobilization SNS was de facto preparing the fertile soil for the emergence of more radical, extremist forces (for example Ľ'S-NS), which unlike the SNS apply the activist methods to show the high degree of their decisiveness to defend "national case" (direct actions on the ground, street demonstrations and marches, clashes with police and "enemies" (Roma, homosexuals, pro-democratic civil society activists) etc. Long-term SNS activities, feeding the nationalist discourse, and the party's discredited image as a corrupt force in the eyes of potential supporters that caused the weakening of its electoral support, created the favorable conditions for extremists."

Later, Kotleba- People's Party Our Slovakia-a radical rights wing extremist party-overtaken SNS in competing nationalist agenda. These parties targeted Roma, Hungarian and Muslim minorities. Kotleba is totally anti-system and poses a serious threat to democracy, it renewed its attack on minorities when it became a junior partner with Smer-SD – a left wing nationalist party- in 2012. In Slovakia, the radical right radicalized the public discourse (Minkenberg 2010). The distinctiveness of the Slovak radical right voters lies in their opposition to the status elevation of politically backed minority groups; that is, by hostility towards politically organized minority groups

that extract concessions from the dominant majority and not by prejudice per se or xenophobic preferences (Bustikova 2014).

Nature of Slovak Nationalism

The essence of nationalism is predicated on exclusion and inclusion; the establishment of criteria for and the emphasis on the implications of (not) belonging to the nation are fundamental to nationalist politics, along with the means of achieving congruence between the ethnic and the political (Ucen 2009:22). Slovakia, a post-communist nation, has been used as a case study to illustrate the rise of nationalism, which has been characterised by the presence of semi-authoritarian populists and radical-right nationalists (Gyárfášová, 2019). According to scholars, the emergence of radical right political parties and nationalism in Slovakia can be attributed to deep-rooted legacies, a historical background, and structural conditions (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). Bartek Pytlas (2016, cited in Gyárfášová, 2019:202) posts those historical narratives of collective identity function as pivotal templates for radical right political agency, given the fundamental role of a romanticized, mythic vision of the nation in underpinning this ideology. Slovak nationalism manifests in moderate and radical forms, however civic nationalism predominates in Slovakian mindsets. The most common typology of nationalism exists in an oppositional manner; Western against Eastern, civic against ethnic, inclusive against exclusive (Hans Kohn, cited in Deegan-Krause 2004:263). Deegan-Krause (2004) identifies various forms of nationalism in Slovakia, including peripheral nationalism against the majority (against the Czechs); peripheral nationalism against a foreign country, such as Hungary (with the threat of Hungarization in the south-border region); peripheral nationalism against regional or global institutions (the West); and state-building nationalism against non-homeland minorities (Roma and Muslims).

Radical ethnic nationalism is a relatively minoritarian political force in Slovak politics and certain segments of Slovak society. A populist political approach is observable among both ethnic nationalist political parties and other groups. This phenomenon is not confined to the far-right sectors of the political spectrum, but rather constitutes a component of the mainstream itself (Mikenberg 2002). Indeed, the nationalist movement and right-wing national and populist parties have constituted an integral part of Slovak politics since the early years of the democratic transition (Gyárfášová, 2019). Key actors include the Slovak National Party (SNS), a prominent proponent of Slovak nationalism since the 1990s, and subsequently Kotleba–People's

Party Our Slovakia, which adopted a radical, extreme right-wing agenda, rejecting both human and minority rights. The party's slogan, 'One God, One Nation', is indicative of its alignment with the ideologies of the Nazi-sponsored wartime cleric-fascist state. In its manifesto, the party pledges to protect the fatherland and expel all immigrants (Harris 2019).

Following the collapse of communism, a broad, inclusive national movement emerged in Slovakia, gaining dominance over other sectors of civil society in terms of mobilisation power, collective protest, and a notable presence in the public sphere (Malova, 2003). This movement, termed 'The Slovak National Movement', was driven by the objective of promoting Slovak national interests. Following the transition period, the majority of political parties were established as a result of social movements and subsequently underwent a transformation into a political party. These parties were predominantly anti-elite, positioned outside of the established political elite circle, and appealing to frustrated and alienated voters (Havelka, 2016:203). During the 1990s and 2000s, the SNS was the driving force behind the nationalist agenda, until 2012 when it failed to attain the 5% threshold. In 2010, a strong competition for a radical agenda emerged. The 'nationalism light', as represented by Smer-SD, competed with extremist radical parties such as L'SNS on social and economic issues. In 2016, SNS returned to parliament as a junior partner in a coalition government led by the left-leaning Smer-SD (Gyárfášová, 2019). Concurrently, the Most-Híd ethnic party endeavoured to establish a conduit between the Slovak and Hungarian communities. At the public level, Slovakian people have been found to be more receptive to nationalist appeals that are shaped by 'perception of the others', historical memory and geopolitical mentality (Gyárfášová, 2019). Slovakian society is characterised by long-lasting social distance towards national minorities and foreigners (Ibid). In fact, since 1989, this distance is articulated in (by political elites) political opportunism towards the national minorities, such as Hungarian and Roma. The mobilization of intolerance and denying/disrespecting the rights of minorities became a central political issue.

The Slovak public perceives its country from an ethnocentric perspective, a viewpoint that is reflected in the actions and policies of the political elite. The migration crisis of 2015 gave rise to a situation in which political and public discourse became increasingly marked by 'xenophobization'. This, in turn, created a discursive opportunity for political parties, which the ruling Smer-SD party was the first to exploit (Ibid). Furthermore, the nationalist and radical parties have effectively normalised the assertiveness of Slovakia's Christian roots, which has contributed to the marginalisation

of minority groups. Christianity is the dominant religion in Slovakia. The Catholic Church has played a significant role in shaping Slovak national identity, traditional values, and cultural heritage (Tížik, 2021:16). Following the year 1989, a process of Catholicization of the Slovak state ensued, manifesting in the form of the obligation of the state to fund the Catholic Church and the designation of Christian religious holidays. Tížik (2021:16) contends that this has had the effect of weakening the secular Constitution and pluralism, and emboldening radical right nationalists to assert both the Christian religious dominance and Slovakia as a Christian homogenous nation, while 'othering' other minorities such as Muslims.

Islamophobia and Anti-Immigrant/Refuges Narratives by Radical Right in Slovakia

As per 2021 census Muslim population in Slovakia is around 3,862 persons. However, According to Islamic foundation survey (2023) their population could be between 5,000 to 7000. The majority of Muslims in Slovakia are Arabs, followed by Albanians, Bosnians, and Afghans. There are also smaller numbers of Turks, Pakistanis, Muslims from the former USSR, and several hundred Slovak converts. Islam is not currently a registered religion in Slovakia, as the total number of believers does not meet with a criterion defined by legislation on religion registration (which stipulates 50000 active believers for registration eligibility). This legislation has been criticised by many, and considered not only as too strict, but also as discriminatory and constituting an obstacle to the basic right of religious freedom (Sekulova 2021). The Muslim community continued to report anti-Muslim hate speech on social media, which it mostly attributed to public statements by politicians portraying Muslim refugees as a threat to the country's society (US State Report 2023). According to a survey by a local nongovernmental organization (NGO), a majority of Slovaks, citing the religion as "very dangerous," held negative attitudes toward Muslim refugees and migrants; 43 percent believed Islam should be banned in the country (US 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Slovakia). Many political parties continued to express anti-Muslim views in their public statements. In messaging ahead of the September 2023 parliamentary election, leaders from across the political spectrum, including Smer-SD, Hlas (Voice – Social Democracy (HLAS – sociálna demokracia), Republika, and LSNS, engaged in rhetoric portraying undocumented migrants, predominantly from Muslim-majority countries, as a serious and imminent threat to security and public order, and demanded urgent, resolute action to prevent their influx in society (Ibid).

In Slovakia the refugee issue was employed by the ruling party, Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), as one of the main campaign issue before the parliamentary election in March 2016. Prime Minister Fico portrayed middle eastern Muslims as a terrorist, he provoked xenophobia among the Slovak population, de facto competing not only with nationalists from the SNP, but even with right-extremists from the People's Party-Our Slovakia (Gyarfasova 2017). In 2024, Interior Minister and Hlas party chief Matúš Šutaj Eštok, provoked controversy when he drew connection between Islam and terrorism and warned Slovaks that Syrian Muslim refugees may enter into Slovakia (Dlhopolec 2024). Islamophobia in Slovak political discourse exacerbates societal prejudices. Politician Alojz Hlina made misleading remarks about Sharia law, suggesting it promotes violence against women, thereby reinforcing harmful stereotypes (Islamic Foundation report 2023). The Slovak National Center for Human Rights report "Nenávistný jazyk na politických facebookových profiloch," documents frequent Islamophobic comments on political Facebook profiles, often portraying Islam as a security threat and using Muslim identity derogatively. These narratives were particularly prevalent during political events like the European Union's vote on the migration pact in June 2023 (Islamic Foundation report 2023). In 2023, there were seven notable incidents, indicating an increase in severity. Although the topic of migration was not prominent in Slovak political discourse in 2023, these incidents underscore the persistent issue of anti-Muslim sentiment (Ibid).

Despite their limited visibility and non-recognition of their religion, Muslims continues to be a punching bag for the most of the far right and radical parties in Slovakia, who project Muslims as an outside thereat to the Slovakian Christian culture, and want to be seen as a protector of the nation (Gyarfasova 2017). Muslims, may not be much in numbers, however, they (Muslim) very much exist in political discourses even if there is no election. However, it is important to note, unlike India (where Muslims are historical target of Hindu nationalists), Slovakian nationalism is traditionally oriented towards, autochthonous minorities. such as Hungarian. Islamophobia is relatively new phenomenon in Slovakia arising due to the migration flow. They are the 'new other' created by radical right parties and the extremists organizations and individuals. And, political scenario in India is no different than Slovakia. Interestingly, despite the constant dehumanization of minorities such as Muslims and Roma (along with other factors), Slovakia still classified as 'free democracy' whereas India has become a 'partly free democracy' (Freedom House report 2024) where genocide of Muslims are considered to be impending (Genocide Watch (2022) under radical right Hindu nationalist party in the power.

Evolution of Hindu Nationalism and Radical Right Populism in India

India gained independence from British rule on August 15, 1947. India inherited and readily adopted a constitution that was Western in its core. Thus, ideas such as democracy, secularism, women's rights, freedom of opinion and expression, and equality of religions became legal norms in a society gripped by communal strife, religious fanaticism, feudalism, and caste hierarchy (Khilnani 2016). Low literacy, extreme inequality, and poverty among the masses after two hundred years of British colonial rule hampered the path for the modern developmental progress sought by Jawahar Lal Nehru, India's first prime minister. The Indian Constitution affirmed (as legal norms) freedom of expression, women's rights, and minority rights, and considered secularism essential to Indian democracy (Bhargava 1996). However, the process of secularization of religious communities, especially Hindus and Muslims, brought their faith into direct confrontation with Western secular values. It is important to note, secular ideals, have been challenged by a history of religious and ethnic unrest that first peaked with the partition of British India (1947) and later dominated the political scene in the 1980s, 1990s, and again in 2000s (Pardesi & Oetken, 2008:23). Religious communities, especially radical and extremist elements within Hindu orthodoxy, were troubled by the secular idea of religious equality, which gave equal constitutional rights to Muslim religious minorities in particular (Khilnani 2016). The influential Hindu radical right and extremist (Hindu nationalists/*Hindutva)* organizations had barely accepted the Indian constitution and flag and rejected the idea of secularism, religious equality, women's rights, and human rights (Tharoor, 2020). In 1915, the *Hindu Mahasabha*-a radical Hindu organisation-designated India as a Hindu nation and believed in the supremacy of Hindu culture, religion, and heritage. Savarkar, the president of the *Hindu Mahasabha*, coined the term '*Hindutva*', it denotes an extreme form of Hinduization of Indian politics, in which foreign religious influences (Muslims, Christians) and religious institutions are pushed out of Indian culture.

One of the most radical extremist Hindu organizations, the RSS (*Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh),* with the intention of uniting Hindus and protecting their religious purity from foreign cultural influences was founded in 1925. Interestingly, RSS never participated in India's freedom struggle against the British, and many occasions supported colonial powers in weaking the freedom struggle (Tharoor 2020; Singh 2024). RSS knew, if India got Independence, it's not going to be a Hindu nation, rather a secular country under the Congress party, which has led the freedom movement. Still a marginal force in the 1930s, the RSS gained momentum in the 1980s and is now a hegemonic force in

India. In its formative period from 1925 to 1980, the RSS promoted the idea of Hindu nationhood and the superiority of Hindu culture and religion over other religions, leading to numerous communal riots (Jaffrelot 1996). RSS has many affiliated extremist organizations (known as the Sangh parivar (family), especially the *Vishva Hindu Parishad* (VHP), Bajrang Dal, Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad (All India Student Association), their main duty is to terrorizes religious minorities, invoke riots and repress liberal and democratic voices challenging Hindu nationalism and their leaders. These organizations usually create communal tension between Hindu and Muslim before the national and the state elections to polarize Hindu voters (Jaffrelot 1996). Most of the religiously motivated attacks have been carried out out by ultranationalist, right-wing Hindu groups, such as *Hindu Yuva Vahini, Hindu Jagran Manch, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Bajrang Dal, and Sri Ram Sena* (Human rights watch 2023; Release International); These groups are linked to the ruling BJP, which uses Hindutva/Hindu nationalism (Hindu nationalism is political use of Hindu religion) to turn the sentiments of the majority against Christian and Muslim minorities for political gains.

Hindu Nationalism

Hindu nationalism is an ethnic form of nationalism. It is radically far-right, hierarchical, authoritarian and based on the idea of Hindu supremacy. Hindu nationalism seeks uniformity through the imposition of Hindi language, Hindu religion, Hindu mythology, and unquestioned loyalty to the nation (Jaffrelot 1996). On different levels, it seeks to repress dissenting views, expunging discourses of religious pluralism and secularism from the political discourse. Hindu nationalism is a dangerous cocktail of religion and politics; it supports the discriminatory Caste system, affirm lowly position of women and Dalits, negates racial and religious equality, and disregards the discourse of human rights (Singh, 2023, 2024). It is inherently Islamophobic. RSS is a parental organization of the current ruling party of India, BJP (Bhartiya Janta Party). Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been a full time RSS worker in the past, notorious for his complicity in the Godhra communal riots when he was the chief minister of the Gujarat state in 2002 (Mann 2014). The goal of the current Hindu nationalist government is to make India a Hindu nation. A national narrative of hatred, pride, and anger are being employed (against Muslims) in the construction of their socio-political theme which have shaped the current political discourse in India. However, it should be noted that in 1947, under the Congress party, the Indian State adopted a secular democracy, particularly to avoid multicultural conflicts (Khilnani 2016).

Due to its violent activities RSS was banned three times. Mahatma Gandhi was killed by a RSS worker in 1948. In order to avoid ban and to gain political power, RSS members, in 1951 established, The *Bharatiya Jana Sangh party* (BJS; Indian People's Association) which later became BJP in 1980s. The Congress national party, led the Indian freedom struggle and later dominated the Indian politics until 1980s; it upheld the secular, and liberal democratic values, promoted religious harmony in deeply diverse Indian society where Hindu constitute approximately 80% and Muslim 14.2% and Christians are 2.3 % (28 million) as per Indian census (2011). However, since 1920s, various Hindu radical extremist group such as Hindu Maha Sabha, RSS (Rastriya Sweym Sevak Sangh) opposed Congress' secular-liberal stand on religious minorities, and conspired to build an authoritarian Hindu nation where religious minorities shall be a second-class citizen. Congress, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and later Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, promoted an 'inclusive nationalism' which included everyone irrespective of their class, caste, religion and ethnicity (Khilnani 2016). However, Hindu radical extremist (RSS/BJP) organizations rejected this and staunchly supported Hindu nationalism or Hindutva. As political influence of Congress declined in 1980s due to corruption, rise of Hindu nationalism, as an alternative, became imminent.

However, process of globalization also catalyzed the rise of Hindu nationalism in India. The rapid socioeconomic (1990s) changes resulting from globalization affected people's sense of their own identity and created an "ontological insecurity' among those who felt excluded and insecure in the modern world (Kinnvall 2004). They felt the loss of their traditional identity and social structure, as well as a sense of helplessness because they no longer have control over their lives. They feel that their identity is insecure and unstable, so the collapse of the social structure (probably) forces these groups to renew their sense of security (Kinnvall 2004:741). However, the individual's search for a stable identity may lead him/her to join an identity-based group that seems to provide answers to his/her stability - an ontological security. In this context, the RSS (and the growth of Hindu nationalism) in India is a relevant case that attempts to provide "ontological security' to Hindus in a "Hindu nation' based on a unique identity and certainty. Kinnvall (2004:747) noted that those who feel ontologically insecure and marginalized often provoke politics of resistance and the growth of local identities; this explains the exponential rise of *Hindutva* politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Hindutva leaders offer a 'securitised narrative' to the desperate Hindu masses through the discourse of 'religion' and 'nationalism' because it has been able to construct powerful narratives and beliefs

that convey an image of security and stability (which can be 'secured' only in a 'Hindu nation'). The Muslim as an object of 'insecurity' in the Hindu nationalists' discourse is discursively con- structed as a site of fear, distrust, and hatred, thus generating desires for abjection and extermination (Anand 2005). In this context, it is the Muslims who pose a threat to the security of the nation and Hindu society which must be secured at all costs.

Due to the sudden impact of the globalization on Indian upper and middle class; they find their family values, caste system, traditional power and hegemony (over lower classes of the society) challenged, meanwhile, Hindu nationalist party, BJP offered Hindu masses an 'ontological security' by restoring the ancient glory of India and targeting the eternal enemy of the nation-Muslim and Christians. Hindu majority embraced Bjp by electing a radical right Hindu nationalist Narendra Modi as Prime Minister with absolute majority in 2014, 2019, and later with reduced majority in 2024. India was ruled by Islamic empire before it was colonized by the British. Thus, due to historical animosity between Hindu and Muslims, it is easy to religiously polarize Hindu masses against Muslims. This has provided a fertile ground for far right and radical extremist to grow in the Indian society who frequently invoke historical animosity and Islamophobia among Hindu masses leading the communal riots; and this profits them in national and state elections. Currently, India is ruled by the BJP- a political front of RSS-under a radical right Hindu leader, Narendra Modi (Ammassari et all 2022).

Mainstreaming of Islamophobia in Indian Politics

Hindu nationalists under the current radical right Prime Minister have created 'ontological insecurity' among the Hindu majority by making appearing Hindu identity threatened by foreign cultures, particularly Islamic and Christianity in India. Hindu nationalists spread the propaganda that Indian Muslims are taking over India by populating and capturing the economic resources, and Christians are converting Hindus to Christianity, and spreading the Christian culture thus presenting an imminent threat to Hindu religion and cultural identity. The use of the Hindu religion under the Modi government has reached new heights, leading to an increase in the Hindu majority's hostility toward religious minorities (Singh n.d.). With the growing influence of Hindu nationalism on Indian society, the religious persecution of minorities is likely to escalate in tandem with a decline of secular democracy. In their efforts to recover the lost glory of India, Hindu nationalist government pursue a number of policies. These include securing the Babri mosque site for a Hindu temple and renaming places with

Hindu names (often replacing Muslim names). Simultaneously, Modi government have stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special status through the dilution of Article 370, and moved towards a new citizenship law with the potential to exclude Muslims from Indian citizenship. Hindu nationalists demand total assimilation of religious minorities. This withholds any special constitutional privileges which would allow minorities to keep their distinct religious identities. Bulldozing the homes of Muslim protestors has almost become a populist policy of Hindu nationalism in the Bhartiya Janta Party-ruled states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhaya Pradesh. Acts of violence in full public view against Muslims have a certain appeal among core Hindu nationalist supporters (Human Rights Watch 2023).

The Hindu radical right party, Bhartiya Janta Party, has 'hijacked' Hinduism; in the building of the fantasy narrative of the great Hindu nation while excluding Indian Muslims and Christians from Indian civilization as adherents of a foreign culture. Hindu nationalist has singled out religious minorities, the 'others' as threat to the 'the Hindu people' and their culture. Saleem noted (2021) that increase in Hindu populism in India has targeted towards the exclusion of religious minorities asserting the claims of 'authentic people' of the land by the Hindu nationalists. In general, elements of populism in Hindu religious populism, such as its 'anti-pluralistic' attitude towards religious diversity, and tendency to eliminate civil society, presents a true danger for secular Indian democracy and for the rights of religious minorities in India. It is important to note, Bjp did not file any Muslim candidate for national elections. Under, the Modi regime, since 2014, Islamophobia has reached to a dangerous level; The U.S. State Department's 2023 religious freedom report on India, noted violent attacks on minority groups, especially Muslims and Christians, including killings, and assaults. Report noted concerning increase in anti-conversion laws, hate speech, demolitions of homes and places of worship for members of minority. Since Modi's populist call to Hindu nationalism, India's 200 million Muslims find themselves potentially on the brink of impending genocide (Genocide Watch 2022). RSS/BJP has gained prominence and power in Indian society due to their use hard core Islamophobic narratives and violent activates.

Comparative Analysing of Politics of Nationalism in Slovakia and India

Against the backdrop of the previous discussion on Slovak and Hindu nationalism and radical right in Slovakia and India, this section compares the similarity and differences focussing on the themes coming out of discussion from the previous sections concerning ethno-nationalism, nativism, religious-nationalism and authoritarianism.

Ethno-Nationalism, Nativism and Religious-Nationalism

In the cases of Slovakia and India, the politics of ethno-nationalism have dominated the mainstream political landscape for at least the last decade. In both countries, radical right and extremist parties and groups have enforced an ethnic and territorial conception of identity. The concept of Hindu nationalism, akin to that of Slovak nationalism, is predicated on cultural and ethnic nationalism, with the majority population in both countries perceiving their nation ethnocentrically (Gyarfasova 2019, Singh 2024). However, in contrast to India, Slovakia lacks a profound ethnic and religious multicultural history, and its population has not historically interacted with non-Western populations. Radical right and extremist parties and groups in both countries have promoted and mainstreamed the concept of the 'nativist' state, advocating for its exclusive domination by members of their respective native groups. For instance, Hindu radical right groups espouse the belief that India belongs exclusively to Hindus, perceiving them as the indigenous people of the nation. This belief system asserts that a Hindu individual must be the ruler of the nation, thereby denying rights to religious and ethnic minorities, including citizenship. In contrast, in the Slovak context, radical right and extremist parties and groups, such as Kotleba, have promoted the exclusion of Muslim, Hungarian and Roma communities from the concept of the Slovak nation. The basis of the concept of defining (non) 'nativeness' can be ethnic, racial or religious, and include a cultural component (Mudde 2007:19).

The utilisation of 'nativist' ideology by Hindu and Slovakian nationalists has been identified as a key factor in the formation of two opposing groups within the population, leading to a rejection of Western liberal democratic principles. For instance, religious minorities (specifically Muslims), liberals and seculars to a certain extent, have been excluded from the concept of an 'ethnic nation' due to their foreignness and resistance to conservative ideas (such as patriarchy and traditional ethics) respectively. Those who advocate for human rights, gender diversity, and racial and religious equality are often perceived as 'traitors'. In this context, concepts such as democracy and secularism have been rejected by radical right and extremist groups in India and Slovakia because of their Western origin. Hindu nationalists are vehemently opposed to secularism, liberal democracy and human rights, as these concepts are founded on principles of religious and gender equality. In Slovakia, democracy is rejected due to its perceived failure to address the needs of the indigenous population, which is seen as originating from the West. According to the GlobSEC report (Hajdu, 2020), 50% of Slovaks perceive the "West" as a threat to their values and identity. The political orientation of Kotleba is

characterised by a wholesale rejection of democratic principles and a flagrant disregard for minority rights and human rights more broadly. Kotleba's stance is emblematic of an anti-system orientation, a phenomenon that bears a striking resemblance to the actions of the BJP under Modi's leadership in India. The RSS, the ideological parent organisation of the BJP, has historically rejected secularism and the Indian Constitution, instead advocating for an archaic Indian societal structure that is firmly rooted in a caste-based and gender-hierarchical framework. It is imperative to acknowledge the role of right-wing radicalism as a political ideology, characterised by a nationalistic myth, romantic and populist ultra-nationalism, and a stance against the principles of liberal and pluralistic democracy (Minkenberg 2002).

In both countries, nativist ideology has been extensively employed to create division within the population based on religious affiliation. For instance, Slovakia has been designated as a Christian country, while India has been identified as a Hindu nation. Despite the constitutional secularism of the respective states, which is intended to ensure the separation of religion and state, radical right parties and their leaders have been known to openly favour the majority religion while demonising religious minorities for political gain. Within Slovakian politics, the nationalist and radical parties have effectively normalised the assertion of the Christian roots of Slovakia, thereby fostering an environment of othering towards religious minorities (Tížik 2021:16). Interestingly, during the election, radical right in India and Slovakia while stressing on identity politics invoke strong sentiments which supersede all other meaningful issues for campaign such as economy, education and the promotion of democratic values (Saxonberg et al. 2023). The public emotions generally channelized against political opposition, and minorities to whom radical rights treats as an enemy of the nation and 'religion' is frequently used to inflame passion against such enemy to divide the people.

Divisive Binaries

Radical rights and extremist parties and groups, in both countries, have created an enemy to profit from. This enemy is 'Muslim'. The utilisation of this divisive binary as a populist rhetoric has been instrumental in inciting nationalist and jingoistic politics, particularly during the election period, leading to heightened religious polarisation. One aspect of religion that populists find particularly useful is the divisive binaries that religion creates by dividing people into 'us' and 'them'. Within this framework, 'us' is defined as indigenous, pure, and loyal to the nation, while 'them' is seen as foreign and disloyal. Within the Hindu populist-nationalist framework, the term 'Hindu' is defined

as 'son of the land', embodying a sense of sacredness and loyalty to the nation of India. Muslims and Christians, in contrast, are often labelled as invaders and disloyal to the nation (Khilnani 2016). Prominent BJP leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, and Chief Minister Adiya Nath, have been at the forefront of spreading Islamophobic sentiment and condoning violence against Muslims. Their persistent animosity towards Muslims, perceived as an eternal adversary of Hindus, has led to the normalisation of violence against Muslims (Singh n.d.). Conversely, in Slovakia, Islamophobic rhetoric has been strategically employed by radical right parties to gain political advantage, as previously discussed in this paper.

During the migrant crisis of 2016, anti-Muslim sentiments escalated significantly (Slovakia Muslim Foundation Report, 2023). The leaders of the Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD) party, Prime Minister Fico (2016) and Interior Minister and Hlas party chief Matúš Šutaj Eštok (2024), provoked controversy when they drew a connection between Islam and terrorism. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the Indian Muslim population of approximately two hundred million, Slovakia's Muslim population is approximately 7,000, with a single mosque. There is no historical enmity between Slovaks and Muslims, as evidenced by the absence of similar animosity between Hindus and Muslims in India. Nevertheless, radical right and extremist groups in Slovakia have targeted Muslims for political gain. However, it should be noted that the religious persecution of Muslims by radical right and extremists in India is more systemic and brutal (Human Rights Watch, 2025). Despite the prevailing economic downturn, increasing poverty, rising unemployment, and escalating socio-political tensions, Modi secured victory in the 2019 national election, primarily by capitalising on anti-Muslim sentiment. In contrast, Slovakia witnessed a different electoral dynamic, where the ruling left-wing populist Direction – Social Democracy (Smer) party lost its majority in the 2016 election, despite the attempts of its leader, Robert Fico, to polarise ethnic Slovaks against Muslim refugees in his speeches (Slovakia Islamic Foundation Report 2023).

Reaffirming Homogeneity

The overemphasis on national belonging through 'social homogeneity', whereby the ethnic and religious 'other' is excluded, constitutes the fundamental tenet of radical right-wing ideology (Minkenberg 2002). Radical right parties and organisations around the world have adopted a similar pattern of enforcing ethnic and cultural homogeneity,

and India and Slovakia are not an exception to this. Following the establishment of an independent Slovak Republic in 1993, radical groups were unable to implement their concept of an ethnically "pure" nation-state, as the Slovak Republic asserted its commitment to democratic values. The adoption of an ethnic-based definition of the Slovak Republic would have discriminatory implications for minority groups residing within its borders, including Hungarians, Roma, Ruthenians, and Muslims (Meseznikov, 2021). Consequently, radical-nationalist and right-wing extremist forces only partially achieved their objectives during the initial period of political transition in the post-communist era. In autumn 2011, the liberal ruling coalition SDKÚ-DS – SaS – KDH – Most-Híd, after less than 1,5 years of its operation (July 2010 – October 2011) lost confidence in parliament. This created favourable conditions for the rise of right-wing extremism. In 2012–2016, Smer-SD, as a single ruling party, tried to gain full control over influential state positions and marginalizing opposition in an unusual way violating the norms in the liberal democracy (Meseznikov, 2021). Meanwhile, after two unsuccessful attempts in the parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2012, ĽSNS finally managed to become a relevant political force in 2016. The party further consolidated its growing position in Slovak politics in the 2020 and 2026 elections. They proceeded to pursue their xenophobic agenda, emphasising the homogeneity of the Slovak nation (Ibid), in contrast to the pluralistic, ethnic, and religious diversity that characterised the preceding period. A comparable sequence of events unfolded in India. Radical Hindu nationalists and extremists were intent on transforming India into a Hindu-majority nation. However, following India's independence in 1947, the limited socio-political influence these groups exercised over the masses, coupled with the dominance of the secular Congress party, impeded the fulfilment of their nationalist agenda. Nevertheless, the organisation of various religious riots since 1947, and the provocation of Hindus against Muslims, served to maintain their visibility and political significance (Khilnani 2016). It was only in the 1980s that they began to make modest gains in national elections, securing two seats in the national parliament. However, it was under the Hindu nationalist leadership of Narendra Modi in 2014 that the radical right and extremist BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), acting as a political front for the radical extremist group RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), made a significant breakthrough in Indian politics, winning 282 seats out of 543 and initiating their agenda of promoting Hindu homogeneity while dehumanising Muslims and liberals.

It is important to note that 'religion' and 'nationalism' are the two most significant identity signifiers, providing stability and security to the majority in times of perceived

crisis (Kinnvall 2019). Radical right-wing nativists and population groups perceive a threat to the homogenous nation-state when non-native elements, whether individuals, groups or ideologies, appear to compromise its cohesion (Mudde 2007). In Slovakia, radical right and extremist groups portray Muslim communities as threatening the purity of Slovakian Christian culture (Tijkik 2021:16). Similarly, in India, Hindu nationalists perceive Muslim communities as threatening Hindu culture, thereby establishing them as a threat to their religion and nation (Singh 2024). In both cases, radical right and extremist groups are characterised by their opposition to diversity and pluralism, advocating for a homogeneous Christian and Hindu identity. Consequently, elements deemed non-indigenous, whether linguistic, cultural or religious, are excluded from the political discourse. This has led to the dehumanisation of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Muslims, whose religion and culture are perceived as foreign, threatening, and incompatible with the national identity. The current Slovakian state, under Robert Fico, is promoting a homogeneous political viewpoint centred on national pride, Christian values, and Slovak folklore, with the aim of suppressing political pluralism and minority rights (Krempaska 2024). This pattern is very similar to that of the Modi government in India (Human Rights Watch 2024).

Nationalism Becomes Authoritarianism

Under the influence of radical right and extremist in India and Slovakia, nationalism has been turned against the liberal democracy. In Slovakia, following the return of Robert Fico in 2023, there has been a diminution of the rule of law and a reshaping of the state apparatus. His ruling coalition comprises SMER-SD, HLAS-SD (Voice – Social Democracy, the party of the current president, Peter Pellegrini), and the SNS (Slovak National Party), which holds positions ranging from right-wing populist to far-right. Fico's governance style is marked by an increasing authoritarian tendency, as evidenced by his tight control over central institutions and a foreign policy that is strongly aligned with Russia and China. Concurrently, the space for dissenting voices is progressively constrained, with independent media being designated as "hostile actors" and "foreign agents." A case in point is the private TV station Markíza, which has faced mounting pressure and has seen its political reporting become largely neutralised (Krempaska 2024). NGOs and representatives of civil society are also facing increasing intimidation (Globsec Trends 2024). The government's attacks on opposition forces, the media, and civil society are indicative of a broader pattern of repression. Liberal and progressive values are increasingly portrayed as threats to the Slovak nation (Krempaska 2024).

The present government of India, led by Prime Minister Modi and characterised by radical right-wing nationalist ideology, is on the verge of establishing a Hindu authoritarian state. The ongoing human rights violations against religious minorities and marginalised groups, the restrictions on academic and press freedom, and the repression of civil society and the media, indicate a departure from the principles of a free democracy. Instead, India is now classified as a 'partially free' country (Freedom House, 2024). The criminalisation of peaceful expression has become a legal norm in Modi's India. The state apparatus, encompassing institutions such as the police, judiciary, election commission, national human rights commission, and secret service agency, along with cultural institutions, has been largely high-jacked by the BJP, the political party associated with Prime Minister Modi. This has led to a scenario where the Indian state has become hostile towards members of civil society and political opposition (Human Rights Watch, 2024). This phenomenon bears a striking resemblance to the events that transpired in Slovakia, where the SNS culture minister, Martina Šimkovičová, dismissed the directors of the Slovak National Theatre and Slovak National Gallery in an effort to exert control over prominent cultural institutions. This action unfolded under the observation of the populist prime minister, Robert Fico (Oltermann, 2024). A concerted crackdown on freedom of artistic expression and a systematic assault on the central European republic's state institutions persist under the Fico government (Ibid). Nevertheless, under Modi's leadership, the nation and its leader have become increasingly intertwined. Any critique of Modi or the BJP is regarded as an affront to the nation, and is consequently met with punishment. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a manifestation of an authoritarian state. The rewriting of history books to omit chapters on secularism, democracy, and social movements is a further authoritarian method of the Hindu nationalist government to suppress resistance and manipulate the facts of Indian history (Truschke 2020). A similar phenomenon has been observed among Slovakian radical right and extremist groups, who also exhibit tendencies towards historical revisionism (Mesežnikov 2021). Radical nationalists in Slovakia tend to mythologize and ethnicize their interpretation of national history, presenting the titular nation as older than it is and placing its ethno-genesis as far back in history as possible (a practice comparable to that of Hindu nationalists, who connect Hindus to the ancient Harappan civilization). Specific displays of promoting a 'national' interpretation of Slovakia's history can be seen as attempts by nationalists to mythologize certain historical periods. Such endeavours encompass the introduction of the concept of 'ancient Slovaks', seeking to modify the currently accepted scientific

concept of the Slovaks' ethno-genesis (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, 2015). Radical nationalists in both countries have sought to reshape the ethno-nation by employing a distorted interpretation of historical folklore and mythology to bolster their nationalistic authoritarian agenda.

Demonizing the Resistance

In a democratic system, citizens are permitted to express their opposition without the threat of coercion from the state or external entities (Diamond 1994). However, within an authoritarian state, the state itself is responsible for the violation of the majority of human rights, most notably the freedoms of speech and assembly, should it perceive opposition from the state or civil society. A parallel can be drawn between the present state of affairs in Slovakia and India to a certain extent. For instance, large-scale protests against Fico in Slovakia (2025) have highlighted concerns about authoritarian leadership. Fico and his cultural minister Martina Šimkovičová (Jabůrkova 2025) have been accused of ignoring the demands to resign, and of coercing civil society and NGOs, whom they have accused of orchestrating a coup d'état with the help of foreign funding and organisations (Dlhopolec 2025). Those who have voiced opposition to the Fico government have been labelled as "hostile actors" and "foreign agents" (Krempaska 2024). A comparison with Slovakia reveals that India appears to be making accelerated move towards becoming an authoritarian state. Any resistance to the Hindu nationalist government is declared 'anti-India' and 'anti-Hindu', and is consequently suppressed and vilified in the national media and by radical right leaders. State actors have been observed to utilise state agencies in a manner that is conducive to the suppression of political opposition and civil society actors. The current environment is characterised by a marked decline in freedom of expression and assembly, reaching levels not witnessed since India's independence (Global Expression Report 2024). The spaces available for those to voice opposition have been significantly curtailed. It is noteworthy that Slovakia, despite being governed by radical right and extremist groups, exhibits a more favourable environment with regard to freedom of expression and assembly in comparison to India. According to the Global Expression Report 2024, Slovakia attained the 34th position in terms of freedom of expression, while India ranked 123rd, indicating a significant restriction on this right. The Democracy Matrix (Democracymatrix.com) further illuminates this disparity, classifying Slovakia as a 'working democracy' in 30th position and India as a 'hybrid regime' in 85th rank. In the context of Slovakia, the mobilisation of the populace in opposition to the Fico government, particularly

in regard to its pro-Russian stance, has been a salient phenomenon. The occurrence of numerous nationwide protests and the persistent nature of this resistance indicate a prevailing sentiment in favour of civic nationalism and a readiness to advocate for liberal democracy (Dlhopolec 2025). While there may be ethno-nationalistic tendencies among certain segments of the population who periodically lend their support to radical right parties, civic nationalism appears to be the prevailing ideology over ethno-nationalist politics. The Indian resistance movement has not yet succeeded in its efforts to challenge the policies of the Modi government. Farmers, students and politicians have voiced strong opposition to Modi's authoritarian policies through various groups, yet the state has effectively neutralised them by leveraging state power, coercion and public vilification. In contrast to the unified stance adopted by Slovaks in their opposition to Fico, Indian citizens, particularly the Hindu majority, appear to be divided along caste and religious lines, exhibiting a conservative disposition towards secular democracy (Singh, 2024). This division has enabled them to collaborate with the Modi government in its endeavours to transform India into an ethno-Hindu nation, consequently resulting in the country's categorization as a 'hybrid regime' (Democracymatricx.com). However, it is evident that, in both countries, radical right parties have led to authoritarianism, resulting in significant confrontations with opposition parties, centralisation of power, attacks on civil society and minorities, disregard for the rule of law, and suppression of independent media.

Conclusion

The radical right in Slovakia and India is ideologically characterised by nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, the quest for a strong state, traditional ethics and revisionism (Mudde, 2007:21). Indian and Slovakian radical right and extremists interpret national history in line with national values and show a preference for authoritarianism over democracy and human rights. Radica right in both the countries employ identity politics invoking public sentiments against religious minorities. Furthermore, both countries have witnessed the utilisation of ethno-nationalism, misinformation, and disinformation to polarise mainstream public discourse, a strategy that has been successful. It is noteworthy that right-wing extremists and radical nationalists in both countries have long occupied a marginal position within the party system. However, the advent of socio-economic change and crisis has enabled these groups to exert influence over voters, thereby polarising mainstream politics (Mesežnikov 2021; Khilnani 2016; Kinnvall 2019). Party politics and public discourse were characterised by anti-

liberal and anti-democratic xenophobia, influenced by these right-wing extremists and radical nationalists. It can thus be concluded that ethno-nationalism and its populist utilisation by radical right factions have engendered substantial impediments for liberal secular democracies. Illustrative of this phenomenon are the instances of weakening secularism and pluralism in Slovakia and India, resulting in the assertion of Christian religious dominance in Slovakia and Hindu religious dominance in India as homogeneous nations, whilst concomitantly demonising and marginalising ethnic and religious minorities within their respective nations. There are similarities of 'different nationalism' across the democracies around the globe, however, I choice to focuses on India and Slovakia.

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